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Abstract
Although creativity is encouraged in the abstract it is often discouraged in educational
and workplace settings. Using an agent-based model of cultural evolution, we
investigated the idea that tempering the novelty-generating effects of creativity with the
novelty-preserving effects of imitation is beneficial for society. In Experiment One we
systematically introduced individual differences in creativity, and observed a trade-off
between the ratio of creators to imitators, and how creative the creators were. Excess
creativity was detrimental because creators invested in unproven ideas at the expense of
propagating proven ones. Experiment Two tested the hypothesis that society as a whole
benefits if individuals adjust how creative they are in accordance with their creative
success. When effective creators created more, and ineffective creators created less
(social regulation), the agents segregated into creators and imitators, and the mean
fitness of outputs was temporarily higher. We hypothesized that the temporary nature
of the effect was due to a ceiling on output fitness. In Experiment Three we made the
space of possible outputs open-ended by giving agents the capacity to chain simple
outputs into arbitrarily complex ones such that fitter outputs were always possible.
With the capacity for chained outputs, the effect of social regulation could indeed be
maintained indefinitely. The results are discussed in light of empirical data.
Keywords: agent-based model, creativity, imitation, individual differences, social
regulation
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The Social Benefits of Balancing Creativity and Imitation: Evidence from an
Agent-based Model
Introduction
Creativity is praised as the hallmark of our humanity, responsible for our greatest
achievements (Mithen, 1998). It is essential for maintaining a competitive edge in the
marketplace (Reiter-Palmon & Illies, 2004; Rule & Irwin, 1988), and has long been
associated with personal fulfillment (May, 1975; Rogers, 1959), self-actualization
(Maslow, 1959), and more recently with the positive psychology movement (Adams,
2012; Kaufman & Beghetto, 2014; Simonton, 2002). However, social norms, policies,
and institutions often stifle creativity (Ludwig, 1995; Sulloway, 1996), and educational
systems do not appear to prioritize the cultivation of creativity, and in some ways
discourage it (Snyder, Gregerson, & Kaufman, 2012; Robinson, 2001). Teachers often
have conscious or unconscious biases against creative students, leading them to act in
ways that suppress creativity (Aljughaiman & Mowrer-Reynolds, 2005; Beghetto, 2007;
Plucker, Beghetto, & Dow, 2004; Westby & Dawson, 1995). Workplaces often
discourage creativity by providing insufficient resources and support for the
development of new ideas, and inappropriate levels of challenge and autonomy
(Amabile, 1998), as well as levels of environmental distraction that are not conducive to
creativity (Stokols, Clitheroe, & Zmuidzinaz, 2002). Is there any rhyme or reason to
society’s mixed messages about the desirability of creativity?
Balancing Novelty with Continuity
There are drawbacks to creativity (Cropley, Cropley, Kaufman, & Runco, 2010;
Ludwig, 1995), one being that generating creative ideas is difficult and time consuming.
Moreover, a creative solution to one problem often generates other problems, or has
unexpected negative side effects that only become apparent after much effort has been
invested (Tomlinson, 1980). Given the costs of creativity, it seems reasonable to
speculate that there may be an adaptive value to the seemingly mixed messages that
society sends about the desirability of creativity; perhaps society is well-served by the
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tension between creative expression and the reinforcement of conventions and
established protocols.
This paper explores the possibility that mechanisms at work encouraging
individual differences in creativity could be beneficial, by ensuring that the society as a
whole both generates new variants and preserves the best of them. This would be
consistent with growing evidence that group behaviour does not always reduce to
individual behaviour (e.g., Anderson, Richardson, & Chemero, 2012; Goldstone &
Gureckis, 2009). It is also consistent with our everyday experience that an extended
social group can reap the rewards of the creative efforts of an individual, i.e., few of us
would be able to build a computer or write a symphony, but they are nonetheless ours
to use and enjoy. We all benefit from the exchange of knowledge, ideas, and artifacts, in
part because of our capacity for social learning, a phenomenon that Bandura (1995)
described as ‘no-trial learning’, which involves learning by observing and imitating
others.
In much of the cultural evolution literature, social learning is contrasted with
individual learning, which involves learning for oneself, and novelty is attributed to
things like copying error (e.g., Henrich & Boyd, 2002; Mesoudi, Whiten & Laland, 2006;
Rogers, 1988). Creativity, if mentioned at all, is equated with individual learning.
However, they are not the same thing. Individual learning deals with obtaining
pre-existing information from the environment through non-social means (e.g., reading
a book), whereas creativity involves generating ideas, behavior, or artifacts that did not
previously exist. In the first case the information comes from the external world; in the
second it is generated internally. Indeed there is increasing recognition of the extent to
which creative outcomes are contingent upon internally driven incremental/iterative
processing (Basadur, 1995; Chan & Schunn, 2015; Feinstein, 2006).
It is well known in theoretical biology that cumulative evolution entails a fusion of
variation generating processes, such as mutation, and processes that preserve fit
variants, such as heredity (Haldane, 1932). It has been suggested that in cultural
evolution the role of variation generation is played by creativity, and the role of
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variation preservation is played by social learning processes such as imitation (Gabora,
1995). “In vivo” studies of scientific laboratories reveal that scientists benefit from
opportunities for distributed reasoning and scaffolding of ideas and interpretations
afforded by social networks (Dunbar, 2000). Similarly, through the interplay of
creativity and social learning, ideas in the arts, sciences, and technology, as well as
customs and folk knowledge, exhibit recombinant growth (Weitzman, 1998), and evolve
over time (Dasgupta, 1994; Jacobs, 2000). The pattern of cumulative cultural change
that results when new innovations draw from and build upon on existing products is
sometimes referred to as the ratchet effect (Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993).
There is also evidence (reviewed in Hills, Todd, Lazer, Redish, & Couzin, 2015)
that firms as well as societies benefit by balancing exploration with exploitation. The
finding of successful solutions is made possible through exploration, while social
learning processes such as imitation assist in the perpetuation and exploitation of these
successful solutions, and continuity is provided by the maintenance and diffusion of
routines, which must evolve in response to changing markets. Organizational leaders
need to provide employee autonomy and be on the lookout for opportunities emerging
from employee efforts, yet balance this with the provision of sufficient constraints to
make goals seem within reach, and the pruning out of inferior ideas (Hunter,
Thoroughgood, Myer, & Ligon, 2011; Mumford & Hunter, 2005). Further evidence for
the notion that productivity involves a balancing of novelty and continuity comes from
a study of alliances between firms based on data for 116 companies in the chemicals,
automotive and pharmaceutical industries (Nooteboom, Van Haverbeke, Duysters,
Gilsing, & Van den Oord, 2007). The authors found an inverted U-shaped effect of
cognitive distance on innovation, where cognitive distance was operationalized in terms
of differences in technological knowledge between the two firms, and innovativeness was
assessed through an analysis of patent applications. They concluded that alliances
between firms with low cognitive distance introduces too little novelty to increase
productivity, while high cognitive distance means insufficient continuity for cumulative
knowledge growth.
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In short, it seems reasonable that the mixed messages society gives about the
desirability of creativity might stem from society’s need to balance novelty generation
with novelty preservation, which can be understood in terms of theoretical
considerations of culture as an evolution process.
Agent-based Models
This interplay between ‘exploration / generation of novelty’ and ‘exploitation /
perpetuation of novelty’ can be examined with an agent-based model. An agent-based
model (ABM) is a computer program that simulates the actions and interactions of
autonomous agents (both individual or collective entities such as organizations or social
groups) in order to assess their effects on the system as a whole (for a review of ABMs
see Niazi & Hussain, 2011). Because ABMs enable us to manipulate variables and
observe the effects in a more controlled manner than in real life, they have proven useful
for investigating questions concerning the diffusion of creative novelty and its impact on
cultural evolution (e.g., Gabora, 2008a, 2008b; Guardiola, Diaz-Guilera, Perez, Arenas,
& Llas, 2002; Iribarren & Moro, 2011; Jackson & Yariv, 2005; Liu, Madhavan, &
Sudharshan, 2005; Sosa & Connor, 2015; Spencer, 2012; Watts & Gilbert, 2014). For
example, results obtained with ABMs suggest that agents in large, diverse populations
tend to be more creative (Gabora, 2008a; Spencer, 2012), the density of communication
links amongst agents produces diminishing returns in term of the benefits on the
invention rate (Bhattacharyya & Ohlsson, 2010), and diverse communities are better at
generating novelty while communities of specialized agents may be better at
communicating novelty Spencer, 2012).
Some computational models referred to as models of cultural evolution (e.g.,
Henrich & Boyd, 2002) allow for as few as only two alternative forms of a cultural trait,
i.e., there is no accumulative ratcheting of novelty. They are thus properly referred to as
models of cultural transmission, not models of cultural evolution. However, others do
allow for genuine accumulation of novelty. In MAV (for ‘meme and variations’), an
ABM of cultural evolution (Gabora, 1995), and precedessor of the model used here,
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novelty was injected into the artificial society through the invention of new actions, and
continuity was preserved through the imitation of existing actions. When agents never
invented, there was nothing to imitate, and there was no cultural evolution. Indeed, it
makes intuitive sense that if everyone relies on the strategy of copying others rather
than coming up with their own ideas, there are no new ideas around to imitate, and the
generation of cultural novelty grinds to a halt. If the ratio of invention to imitation in
MAV was even marginally greater than 0, not only was cumulative cultural evolution
possible, but eventually all agents converged on optimal outputs. When all agents
always invented and never imitated, the mean fitness of cultural outputs was also
sub-optimal because fit ideas were not dispersing through society. (In this cultural
context, fitness refers to value for the agent according to a fitness function, as discussed
at length below.) The society as a whole performed optimally when the ratio of creating
to imitating was approximately 2:1. 1 Extreme levels of creativity were detrimental at
the level of the society, suggesting that there could be an adaptive value to society’s
ambivalent attitudes toward creativity.
Hypotheses and Approach
This paper provides a computational test of three hypotheses that have not
previously been explored in the ABM literature, hypotheses that challenge the common
assumption that more creativity is necessarily better. First, we tested the hypothesis
that society as a whole can suffer if either (1) the ratio of creators to imitators is too
high, or (2) creators are too creative. Although experiments with MAV had shown that
the mean fitness of cultural outputs decreased if agents were too creative, in those
experiment all agents were equally creative. Findings of pronounced individual
differences in creativity (Kaufman, 2003; Wolfradt & Pretz, 2001) suggested that a
1Note that this finding cannot be construed as support for Rogers’ (1988) claim that cheap social learning
does not necessarily increase mean fitness, for several reasons, one being that in MAV, and in the current
work, the concern is the fitness of cultural outputs, not the biological fitness of individuals. These are
sometimes related, but not necessarily, and indeed sometimes at odds with one another (as when tasks
such as preparing food and caring for offspring are neglected due to immersion in a creative project).
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logical next step was to investigate how varying the extent of such individual differences
impacts the society as a whole.
The second hypothesis tested here is that a society can perform better if
individuals are able to adjust how creative they are over time in accordance with their
perceived creative success. There is empirical evidence that children can adjust their
imitative fidelity and level of innovation (Legare, Wen, Herrmann, & Whitehouse,
2015), and that high imitative fidelity can be related to fear of ostracism
(Watson-Jones, Legare, Whitehouse, & Clegg, 2014). Thus, society may balance novelty
and continuity through mechanisms such as selective ostracization of deviant behaviour
unless it is accompanied by the generation of valuable creative output, and
encouragement or even adulation of those whose creations are successful. In this way
society might self-organize into a balanced mix of novelty generating creators and
continuity perpetuating imitators, both of which are necessary for cumulative cultural
evolution. In theory, if effective creators create more, and ineffective creators create less,
the society’s outputs should collectively evolve faster.
A first step in investigating this was to determine whether it is algorithmically
possible to increase the mean fitness of ideas in a society by enabling agents to
self-regulate how creative they are. We refer to this regulatory mechanism as social
regulation (SR) because it could be mediated by social cues such as praise and/or
criticism from peers, family, or teachers, but it is also possible that it involves individual
differences in the ability to detect or respond to such cues, or individuals’ own
assessments of the worth of their ideas, or some combination of these.
A third hypothesis investigated here is that in order for the benefit of this social
regulation mechanism to be ongoing (as opposed to temporary), the space of possible
creative outputs must be open-ended, such that it is always possible for superior
possibilities to be found. In other words, social regulation is advantageous only when it
is possible to obtain fitter outputs than those currently in use.
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The Computational Model
The ABM used here, referred to as “EVOlution of Culture”, abbreviated EVOC,
is a model of cultural evolution that uses neural network based agents that (1) invent
new ideas, (2) imitate actions implemented by neighbors, (3) evaluate ideas, and (4)
implement successful ideas as actions (Gabora, 2008a).2 EVOC was used because it is
amenable to testing the above hypotheses concerning creativity; discussion of general
questions about how culture evolves including comparison with other approaches (e.g.,
Boyd & Richerson, 1985) can be found elsewhere (Gabora, 2008b, 2011, 2013; Gabora &
Kauffman, 2016). The approach is consistent with a growing effort in cognitive science
to leverage computer modeling techniques and knowledge of cognition to understand
aggregate social outcomes (Goldstone & Gureckis, 2009).
EVOC is an elaboration of the above-mentioned MAV (Gabora, 1995), the earliest
computer program to isolate culture as an evolutionary process in its own right so that
it can be compared and contrasted with biological evolution.3 The goal behind MAV,
and also behind EVOC, was to distill the underlying logic of cultural evolution, i.e., the
process by which ideas adapt and build on one another in the minds of interacting
individuals. Agents do not evolve in a biological sense, as they neither die nor have
offspring, but do in a cultural sense, by generating and sharing ideas for actions. The
cultural outputs in EVOC take the form of actions, since Donald (1991) and others
have provided substantial evidence that the earliest elements to evolve through culture,
before grammatical language, were physical actions such as gestures, and the
movements required to make tools.
EVOC has been used to address such questions as how does the presence of leaders
or barriers to the diffusion of ideas affect the fitness and diversity of cultural outputs
2The code is freely available; to gain access please contact the first author.
3The approach can thus be contrasted with computer models of cultural transmission, in which (unlike
models of cultural evolution) there may be as few as two possible outputs, and the outputs do not
become increasingly complex and adapted over time, and with computer models of how individual
learning affects biological evolution (Best, 1999; Higgs, 2000; Hinton & Nowlan, 1987; Hutchins &
Hazelhurst, 1991).
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(Gabora, 2008b). Here, we use it to investigate the social impact of varying the ratio of
creators to imitators and enabling social regulation of individual creativity levels.
We now summarize the architecture of EVOC in sufficient detail to explain our
results.
Agents
Agents consist of (1) a neural network, which encodes ideas for actions and
detects trends in what constitutes a fit action, (2) a “perceptual system”, which
observes and evaluates neighbors’ actions, and (3) a body, consisting of six body parts
which implement actions.
The neural network is an auto-associator because this enables the agent to learn
and execute the action that a neighbor is executing, and thereby imitate successful
neighbors.4 The network is composed of six input nodes and six corresponding output
nodes that represent concepts of body parts (LEFT ARM, RIGHT ARM, LEFT LEG,
RIGHT LEG, HEAD, and HIPS), and seven hidden nodes that represent more abstract
concepts (LEFT, RIGHT, ARM, LEG, SYMMETRY, OPPOSITE, and MOVEMENT).
Input nodes and output nodes are connected to hidden nodes of which they are
instances (e.g., RIGHT ARM is connected to RIGHT). A schematic illustration of the
neural network is provided in Figure 1. Each body part can occupy one of three possible
positions: a neutral or default position, and two other positions, which are referred to as
active positions. Activation of any input node activates the MOVEMENT hidden node.
Same-direction activation of symmetrical input nodes (e.g., positive activation—which
represents upward motion—of both arms) activates the SYMMETRY node.
Insert Figure 1 here.
The neural network starts with small random weights between input/output
nodes. Weights between hidden nodes, and weights between hidden nodes and
input/output nodes, are fixed at +/- 1.0. Patterns that represent ideas for actions are
4Learning in auto-associative networks is unsupervised in the sense that they take in inputs, and try to
organize internal representations based on them.
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learned by training for 50 iterations using the generalized delta rule with a sigmoid
activation function (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986). (See the Appendix for details.)
Training continues until it has learned the identity function between input and output
patterns.
The neural network enables agents to learn trends over time concerning what
general types of actions tend to be valuable (e.g., that symmetrical actions tend to be
fit), and use this learning to invent new actions more effectively (e.g., to increase the
frequency of symmetrical actions). When the ability to learn such trends is turned off,
agents invent at random and the fitness of their inventions increases much more slowly
(Gabora, 2008b).
Invention
An idea for a new action is a pattern consisting of six elements that dictate the
placement of the six body parts. Agents generate new actions by modifying their initial
action or an action that has been invented previously or acquired through imitation.
During invention, the pattern of activation on the output nodes is fed back to the input
nodes, and invention is biased according to the activations of the SYMMETRY and
MOVEMENT hidden nodes. (Note that, were this not the case, there would be little
point in using a neural network. Note also that while in the first iteration the agent is
simply guessing and learning, over the course of a run, invention becomes increasingly
more sophisticated.) To invent a new idea, for each node of the idea currently
represented on the input layer of the neural network, the agent makes a probabilistic
decision as to whether the position of that body part will change, and if it does, the
direction of change is stochastically biased according to the learning rate. If the new
idea has a higher fitness than the currently implemented idea, the agent learns and
implements the action specified by that idea. When “chaining” is turned on (as
discussed below), an agent can keep adding new sub-actions and thereby execute a
multi-step action, so long as the most recently-added sub-action is both an acceptable
sub-action and different from the previous sub-action of that action (Gabora, Chia, &
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Firouzi, 2013).
Imitation
The process of finding a neighbor to imitate works through a form of lazy
(non-greedy) search. The imitating agent randomly scans its neighbors, and adopts the
first action that is fitter than the action it is currently implementing. If it does not find
a neighbor that is executing a fitter action than its own current action, it continues to
execute the current action.
Evaluation: The Fitness Function
Following (Holland, 1975), we refer to the success of an action in the artificial
world as its fitness, with the caveat that unlike its usage in biology, here the term is
unrelated to number of offspring (or number of ideas derived from a given idea). As
mentioned previously, the fitness function in EVOC involves bodily movement, on the
basis of evidence that the earliest elements to evolve through culture were physical
actions. The fitness function used in the first two experiments rewards activity of all
body parts except for the head, symmetrical limb movement, and positive limb
movement. The rationale for this is that many human actions require a stationary head
(to watch what you’re doing), and symmetrical limb movement, i.e., these are relatively
common constraints on many real movements.5 The fitness function was also designed
to meet practical constraints, such as having multiple optima (e.g., an action can be
optimal if either both arms move up or both arms move down.) Multiple optima
enables us to better characterize the effect of a given manipulation on diversity (i.e.,
whether it finds all optima or just one).6
Total body movement, m, is calculated by adding the number of active body
parts, i.e., body parts not in the neutral position. mu is the number of body parts
5Of course, these constraints are not present for all human activities, such as holding a yoga posture.
6Another reason this fitness function was used is that it exhibits a cultural analog of epistasis which
makes it more difficult to solve. In biological epistasis, the fitness conferred by the allele at one gene
depends on which allele is present at another gene. In this cognitive context, epistasis is present when
the fitness contribution to the idea by movement of one limb depends on what other limbs are doing.
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moving upwards.
mh = 1if head is stationary; 0 otherwise
sa = 1 if arms move symmetrically; 0 otherwise
sl = 1 if legs move symmetrically; 0 otherwise
pa = 1 if arms move upwards; 0 if arms move downwards
pl = 1 if legs move upwards; 0 if legs move downwards
Fitness of a single-step action, Fn, is determined as follows:
Fn = m+ 2mu + 10mh + 5(sa + sl) + 2(pa + pl) (1)
The weights reflect intuitive notions about the relative importance of different
aspects of what makes for a fit action. For example, since (as mentioned previously)
almost all actions require that the head remain stationary so as to be able to focus on
stimuli of interest, the weight on mh is very high, and since (as also mentioned
previously) many actions require symmetrical movement, the weight on sa and sl are
moderately high.
Learning
Invention makes use of the ability to detect, learn, and respond adaptively to
trends. Since no action acquired through imitation or invention is implemented unless it
is fitter than the current action, new actions provide valuable information about what
constitutes an effective idea. Knowledge acquired through the evaluation of actions is
translated into educated guesses about what constitutes a successful action using weight
updating through feedback. For example, an agent may learn that more overall
movement tends to be either beneficial (as with the fitness function used here) or
detrimental, or that symmetrical movement tends to be either beneficial (as with the
fitness function used here) or detrimental, and bias the generation of new actions
accordingly.
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The Artificial World
These experiments used a default artificial world: a toroidal lattice with 1024 cells
each occupied by a single, stationary agent, and a von Neumann neighborhood
structure. Creators and imitators were randomly dispersed.7 Runs lasted 100 iterations,
and all data are averages across 100 runs.
A Typical Run
Fitness and diversity of actions are initially low because all agents are initially
immobile, implementing the same action, with all body parts in the neutral position.
Soon some agent invents an action that has a higher fitness than immobility, and this
action gets imitated, so fitness increases. Fitness increases further as other ideas get
invented, assessed, implemented as actions, and spread through imitation. The diversity
of actions increases as agents explore the space of possible actions, and then decreases
as agents hone in on the fittest actions. Thus, over successive rounds of invention and
imitation, the agents’ actions improve. EVOC thereby models how adaptive change
accumulates over time in a purely cultural context.
Experiment One: Effect of Varying the Ratio of Creators to Imitators
The first experiment investigated how varying the level of creativity of individuals
affects the fitness of ideas in society as a whole. To incorporate individual differences in
degree of creativity we modified EVOC such that agents spanned the full range of
possibilities from always creating, to always imitating, to in-between strategies in which
agents created in some iterations and imitated in others. Those that could create at all
are referred to as creators. Those that only obtain new actions by imitating neighbors
are referred to as imitators. It was possible to vary the probability that creators create
versus imitate (i.e., they range from creating all the time to behaving almost like
imitators). Whereas any given agent is either a creator or an imitator throughout the
entire run, the proportion of creators creating or imitating in a given iteration
7In other experiments (Leijnen & Gabora, 2009a) we investigated the results of clustering creators.
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fluctuates stochastically.
Procedure
The proportion of creators relative to imitators in the society is referred to as C.
The creativity of the creators—that is, the probability that a creator invents a new
action instead of imitating a neighbor—is referred to as p. If a creator decides to create
on a particular iteration, there is a 1/6 probability of changing the position of any body
part involved in an action8 The society consists of three subgroups:
1. C × p×N creators attempting to create
2. C × (1− p)×N creators attempting to imitate
3. (1− C)×N imitators attempting to imitate
In previous investigations we measured the diversity of ideas over the course of a
run for different values of C and p. We found that the cultural diversity, i.e., the
number of different ideas implemented by one or more agent(s), was positively
correlated both with the proportion of creators to imitators, and with how creative the
creators were. We also obtained suggestive evidence that when creators are relatively
uncreative, the mean fitness of ideas increases as a function of the percentage of
creators in the society, but when creators are highly creative, the society appears to be
better off with fewer creators (Leijnen & Gabora, 2009b). However, this study had
shortcomings. First, the simulations were performed with small societies of only 100
agents. Second, since action fitness was obtained at only one time slice (the 50th
iteration) for all ratios of creators to imitators, these results did not reflect the
dynamics of the time series. Given a set of series of accumulating value over time, it is
unclear which series is most representative. The series cannot be unambiguously
ordered unless for each pair of series one strictly dominates the other, and that is not
the case here; the curves representing mean fitness at different values of {C, p} increase
monotonically but they may cross and re-cross as time progresses. Thus here we present
a more extensive investigation of the relationship between creativity and society as a
8This gave on average a probability of one change per newly created action, which previous experiments
(Gabora, 1995) showed to be optimal.
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whole that employs a sophisticated solution to the time series problem.
Analysis. We used time series discounting which associates a “present value”
with any future benefit such that the present value of any given benefit diminishes as a
function of elapsed time until the benefit is realized (McDonald & Siegel, 1986). The
standard approach in financial settings is exponential discounting. Given a series of
benefits bt, the Net Present Value (NPV) is defined as:
NPV (b) =
N∑
t=1
rt−1bt with 0 < r ≤ 1 (2)
The discount rate r is normally set as r = (100+i100 )
−1 where i is the interest rate (in
percentage) for the unit period that an investor can obtain from a safe investment. This
basic idea was adapted to analyze the benefit accrued by attaining fit actions for
different values of C and p in EVOC. The first discounting method used was
Time-to-Threshold (TTT) discounting. Since all fitness trajectories were monotonically
increasing, those that reached a reasonably high threshold τ sooner should be valued
higher. We measured how many iterations (time to threshold) it took for fitness to
reach τ . For these runs, τ = 9 was used as a measure of optimal fitness to allow for a
realistic averaging over time.
Whereas imitators need creators, creators should ignore others if they could do
better on their own (p = 1). In other words, the fitness prospects of creators’ ideas
when they work alone can be viewed in a manner analogous to the interest yield of
treasury bonds in investment decisions. This logic suggests another kind of modification
of the standard discounting method. The second adaptation to the basic notion of
discounting we refer to as Present Innovation Value (PIV) discounting. Let N be the
number of iterations and let FC,pt be the mean action fitness at iteration t for parameter
setting {C, p}. Thus F 1,1t is the fitness expectation with no interaction amongst agents.
We define the PIV for any fitness curve as:
PIV (FC,p) = −N +
N∑
t=1
FC,p
F 1,1
(3)
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Thus the PIV value gives us a measure of the extent to which the mean fitness of
outputs benefits or suffers as imitation becomes more prevalent (due to an increase in
either the proportion of imitators or the probability that creators imitate) compared to
a society composed solely of creators creating all the time with no imitation.
Results and Discussion
All results are averages across 100 runs. The 3D graph and contour plot for the
log10 TTT discounting analysis of the time series for different C, p settings are shown in
Figures 2 and 3, respectively. Note that by definition a low TTT value corresponds to
high mean fitness of actions across the society. The TTT method clearly demonstrates
a valley in the adaptive landscape. The line running along the bottom of the valley in
Figure 2 indicates, for any given value of p the optimal value for C, and vice versa.
When p = 1 the optimal value of C = 0.38. When C = 1 the optimal value of p is 0.19.
The global optimum is at approximately {C, p} = {0.4, 1.0}.
Insert Figure 2 here.
Insert Figure 3 here.
The 3D graph and contour plot for the PIV discounting analysis of the time series
for different C, p settings are shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5 respectively. The pattern
is very similar to that obtained with the log10 TTT discounting analysis.
Insert Figure 4 here.
Insert Figure 5 here.
These results show that the first hypothesis—that society as a whole can suffer if
either (1) the ratio of creators to imitators is too high, or (2) creators are too
creative—was supported. Both log10 TTT and PIV analysis of the time series showed
that, although some creativity is essential to get the fitness of cultural novelty
increasing over time, more creativity is not necessarily better. For optimal mean fitness
of agents’ actions across the society there is a tradeoff between C, the proportion of
creators in the artificial society, and p, how creative these creators are.
SOCIAL BENEFITS BALANCING CREATIVITY IMITATION 18
Experiment Two: The Effect of Social Regulation
The second experiment tested the hypothesis that society as a whole benefits
when individuals can vary how creative they are in response to the perceived
effectiveness of their ideas. In theory, if effective creators create more, and ineffective
creators create less, the ideas held by society should collectively evolve faster.
Procedure
Social regulation (SR) was implemented by increasing the invention-to-imitation
ratio for agents that generated superior ideas, and decreasing it for agents that
generated inferior ideas. To implement this the computer code was modified as follows.
Each iteration, for each agent, the fitness of its current action relative to the mean
fitness of actions for all agents at the previous iteration was assessed. Thus we obtained
the relative fitness, RF , of its cultural output. The agent’s personal probability of
creating, p(C), was modified as a function of RF as follows:
p(C)n = p(C)n−1 ×RFn−1 (4)
The probability of imitating, p(I), was 1 - p(C). Thus when SR was on, if the
relative fitness of an agent’s ideas was high the agent invented more, and if it was low
the agent imitated more. p(C) was initialized at 0.5 for both SR and non-SR societies.
We compared runs with SR to runs without it. In this set of experiments only simple,
single-step actions were possible.
Results and Discussion
The mean fitness of the cultural outputs of societies with SR (the ability to
self-regulate inventiveness as a function of inventive success) was higher than that of
societies without SR, as shown in Figure 6. Thus, these results show that the second
hypothesis—that a society can perform better if individuals are able to adjust how
creative they are over time in accordance with their perceived creative success—was
also supported. However, the difference between SR and non-SR societies was
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temporary; the gap between them closed once the space of possible ideas had been
explored. In both SR and non-SR societies mean fitness of actions plateaued when all
agents converged on optimally fit ideas. Thus, the value of segregating into creators and
imitators was short-lived.
Insert Figure 6 here.
The diversity, or number of different ideas, exhibited an increase as the space of
possibilities was explored followed by a decrease as agents converged on fit actions, as
shown in Figure 7. This diversity pattern is typical in evolutionary scenarios where
outputs vary in fitness. What is of particular interest here is that this pattern occurred
earlier, and was more pronounced, in societies with SR than in societies without it.
With SR, superior creators were diverging in multiple directions, so making them more
creative did increase diversity, while Inferior creators merely reinvent the wheel, so
decreasing their creativity had little effect on the total number of different outputs.
Insert Figure 7 here.
Although all agents initially invented and imitated with equal frequency, societies
with SR ended up separating into two distinct groups: one that almost exclusively
invented, and one that almost exclusively imitated, as illustrated in Figure 8. Thus, the
effect of SR on the fitness and diversity of outputs can indeed be attributed to
increasingly pronounced individual differences in their degree of creativity over the
course of a run. Agents that generated superior cultural outputs had more opportunity
to do so, while agents that generated inferior cultural outputs became more likely to
propagate proven effective ideas rather than reinvent the wheel.
Insert Figure 8 here.
Experiment Three: Social Regulation with Chaining
The short-lived but encouraging results of experiment two inspired experiment
three, which tested the hypothesis that benefit from this social regulation mechanism
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could be longterm if the space of possible ideas were open-ended. The space of possible
ideas was made open-ended by allowing simple ideas to be combined or “chained”
together into more complex ideas. Thus, over iterations the complexity of inventions
could steadily increase.
Procedure
The fitness function used in the previous experiments was only useful for
single-step actions; once an agent found an optimal cultural output it continued to do
the same thing, so eventually the mean fitness of actions across the society reached a
plateau. In this next experiment, the chaining of simple actions into complex actions
allowed for a potentially infinite variety of actions and no limit on their fitness.
To implement chaining it was necessary to modify the fitness function. We needed
a fitness function that discouraged simply executing the same fit action again and again
(to capture that cultural evolution entails the learning of sequences of different actions),
that included a natural means of determining when a multi-part action would
terminate, and that was conducive to the cultural evolution of actions that build
cumulatively on previously learned or created actions. This was made possible using
templates to constrain the space of allowable sub-actions that together constitute a
complete action, using an adaptation of the Royal Roads fitness function (Forrest &
Mitchell, 1993). Definitions of terms used in the evaluation of the fitness of an action
are provided in Table One.
Insert Table 1 here.
The fitness function was determined by 45 templates. The templates can be
thought of as defining the cultural significance or utility of types of sub-actions (such as
dance steps). Each template T i consists of six components, one for each body part (i.e.,
T i = tij; j = 1..6). Each body part can be in a neutral position (0) , up (1), down (-1),
or an unspecified position (*). Six examples of templates are provided in Table Two.
For example, in template T i = ∗, 1,−1, ∗, ∗, 0, the left arm is up (LA:1), the right arm is
down (RA:-1), the hips are in the neutral position (HP:0), and the positions of other
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body parts is unspecified (HD:*, LL:*, and RL:*). The templates provide constraints,
as well as flexibility with respect to what constitutes a fit action. For example, in an
optimally fit action, the head must be in the neutral position (in T 1 the first component
is 0) but the positions of other body parts can vary).
Insert Table 2 here.
Calculating the fitness of a template. Assume that D is a sub-action (i.e.,
D = dj; j = 1..6) and T i is the ith template (i.e., T i = tij; j = 1..6). Thus, dj represents
the position of the jth body part and the value of dj can be either 0 (neutral), 1 (up), or
-1 (down). Likewise, the value of tij can be 0, 1, -1, or * (unspecified). Accordingly, the
fitness of sub-action D is obtained as follows:
F (D) =
19∑
i=1
Φ(T i, D)× Ω(T i) (5)
As shown in this equation, fitness is a function of template weight (Φ(T i, D)) and
template order (Ω(T i)).
Φ(T i, D) is a function that determines the weight of sub-action D by comparing it
with template T i. This weight is set to one if each component of the sub-action (i.e.,
dj; j = 1..6) either matches the corresponding component of the template (i.e.,
tij; j = 1..6) or if the corresponding components of the template is unspecified (i.e.,
tij = ∗), thus:
Φ(T i, D) =
{1 if ∀tij ∈ T i : tij = dj or ∗
0 otherwise
(6)
Ω(T i) computes the order of the template T i by counting the number of
components that have a specified value (i.e., tij 6= ∗).
Ω(T i) =
6∑
j=1,tij 6=∗
tij (7)
The acceptable sub-actions are {0, 1,−1, 1,−1, 1}, {0, 1,−1, 1,−1,−1},
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{0,−1, 1,−1, 1, 1}, and {0,−1, 1,−1, 1,−1}.
The fitness function is difficult to solve because it is rugged; there are multiple
milestones, or fitness peaks, that agents must achieve before reaching a plateau. For
example, in Table 2 we see that the action 0,0,0,0,0,0 has a fitness of 6. An agent may
move on from this action to find an action that fits the third order templates with a
fitness of 31, e.g., F (D) : {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0} = 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 1 = 31.
Modeling chaining. The chaining algorithm is illustrated schematically in
Figure 9. Chaining gives agents the opportunity to execute multi-step actions, thereby
increasing the potential diversity of actions and making the space of possible actions
open-ended. An agent can keep adding a new sub-action to its current action so long as
the most recently-added sub-action is both novel and successful.
Insert Figure 9 here.
A sub-action D is considered novel if at least one of its components is different
from that of the previous sub-action. This ensures that a multi-part action actually
consisted of multiple parts (rather than a drawn-out execution of the same sub-action).
It is considered successful if there exists a template T i such that Φ(T i, D) is one:
successful(D) =
{
true if ∃ T i : Φ(T i, D) = 1
false otherwise
(8)
The “successful” constraint was added to mimic the fact that real human actions such
as gesturing and tool-making are generally highly constrained.
The fitness Fc of a multi-step action with n chained single-step actions (each with
fitness Fn) is calculated as follows:
Fc =
n∑
k=1
Fn (9)
Thus agents could execute multistep actions, and the optimal way of going about any
particular step depended on how one went about the previous step. So long as the
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agent continued to invent acceptable new sub-actions, an action could be arbitrarily
long. In general, the more sub-actions the fitter the action. This is admittedly a simple
way of simulating the capacity for chaining, but we were not interested in the impact of
these actions per se. The goal here was simply to enable create a world in which
improvement is always possible.
Note that since multi-step actions tended to be fitter than single-step actions
there was a bias towards multi-step actions. This was necessary to test the hypothesis
that SR is only advantageous so long as it is possible to obtain fitter outputs than those
currently in use. This aspect of the model seems fairly realistic; new ideas do tend to
build on old ones, and often involve increasingly more steps to achieve their final form,
and these new multi-step ideas are often (though not always) fitter than what came
before.
Results and Discussion
With chaining turned on, cultural outputs became increasingly fit over the course
of a run, as shown in Figure 10. This is because a fit action could always be made fitter
by adding another sub-action. Thus the third hypothesis—that in order for the benefit
of this social regulation mechanism to be ongoing (as opposed to temporary), the space
of possible creative outputs must be open-ended, such that it is always possible for
superior possibilities to be found—was supported.
Insert Figure 10 here.
As was the case without chaining, the diversity of ideas with chaining exhibited an
increase as the space of possibilities was explored, followed by a decrease as agents
converged on fit actions, and once again the peak in diversity is earlier and more
pronounced with SR than without it, as shown in Figure 11. However SR diversity
remains higher than non-SR diversity throughout the run because the agents did not
converge on a static set of actions; their actions changed continuously as they found
new, fitter actions. Moreover, SR runs contain creators that are executing highly
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complex actions, and there are more ways of executing a complex action than a simple
one.
Insert Figure 11 here.
Once again we know that the effects of SR on mean fitness and diversity were due
to the segregation of agents over time into distinct groups: those who almost exclusively
invented and those who almost exclusively imitated, as illustrated in Figure 12. Since
with SR there were increasingly pronounced individual differences in degree of creativity
over the course of a run, the differences between SR and non-SR societies can indeed be
attributed to the fact that the best creators were not wasting iterations trying to
imitate inferior neighbors, they could reach relatively remote and complex ideas more
quickly. Agents that generated superior cultural outputs had more opportunity to do
so, while agents that generated inferior cultural outputs became more likely to
propagate proven effective ideas.
Insert Figure 12 here.
Figure 12 shows that when some agents start to specialize in creating, others start
to specialize in imitating, such that across the society as a whole the balance between
creating and imitating is maintained. Bear in mind that since in all the simulations
reported here the agents are stationary and can only imitate immediate neighbors, it is
not the case that imitators are just imitating themselves. In other words, creators and
imitators are not segregated spatially, and there is transmission between them. Thus
the imitators’ efforts are, indirectly, playing a role in the generation of novelty.
Thus, as the balance between creating and imitating gets tilted one way or the
other within individual agents, a new kind of between agents balancing act starts to
unfold, such that both the generation and proliferation of novelty are preserved. These
results support the hypothesis that it is algorithmically possible for social regulation of
individual creativity levels to be a means by which a society balances novelty with
continuity. To our knowledge, this hypothesis has never before been put forward, let
alone tested. The results suggest that it would be fruitful to investigate whether in real
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human societies local exchange of social cues regarding the desirability of creative
efforts has the global effect of balancing novelty with continuity.
General Discussion
The experiments reported here were inspired in part by early work in evolutionary
theory showing that evolution entails a synthesis of processes such as mutation that
generate variants, and processes such as heredity that preserve fit variants (Haldane,
1932). Our results suggest that the generation of cultural novelty through creative
processes is tempered by social learning processes that preserve fit ideas, and that
achieving a delicate balance between the two has benefits for society at large. Although
EVOC agents are highly rudimentary, the model incorporates a drawback of creating: it
incurs costs in terms of time and foregone alternatives. When creative agents invest in
new ideas at the expense of imitating proven ideas they effectively rupture the fabric of
the artificial society by impeding the diffusion of tried-and-true solutions. Imitators, in
contrast, serve as a “cultural memory” that ensure that valuable ideas are preserved.
Experiment One tested the hypothesis that society as a whole can suffer if either
(1) the proportion of creative individuals is too high, or (2) creative individuals are too
creative, by carrying out a set of runs in an ABM that systematically varied the ratio of
creators to imitators, and how creative the creators were. We observed a trade-off
between these two variables, i.e., if there were few creators they could afford to be more
creative, and vice versa, if there were many, their creativity had to be restrained to
exert the same global benefit for society as a whole.
Experiment One has intriguing though speculative implications for hiring
practices in which individuals are expected to work in groups. It suggests that it may
be productive to consider prospective employees in the context of existing team
members and specifically where they stand on the creativity-conformity spectrum. If
there are many creatives, or if they are extremely creative, it may be beneficial to
balance the team with imitators, and vice-versa, to achieve the balance needed to
hasten the cultural evolution of fit outputs.
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The results of Experiment One are consistent with a recent study of 155 ceramic
tile companies in Spain, which found preliminary evidence of a saturation point beyond
which excessive creativity interferes with proliferation of valuable designs, and thus
decreases productivity (Vallet-Bellmunt & Molina-Morales, 2015). This study also
found that companies tended to do better if they focused on one of two alternative
strategies: focus on creativity, or focus on centrality, the later of which entails accessing
knowledge from other, related companies. They write, “as both are resource and
time-costly strategies, not only is a combination of them not synergic, but may in fact
become negative for firms’ innovation performance.” (p. 14) This provides preliminary
evidence that a segregation into creator and imitator strategies need not necessarily
occur at the level of individuals; it may occur at the level of companies, with adaptive
consequences in the real world.
Experiments Two and Three investigated another way in which creativity may be
tempered with conformity: over time, those whose creative efforts are successful might
increase their creativity while those whose creative efforts are unsuccessful might
decrease their creativity, and rely instead on social learning. Experiment Two tested the
hypothesis that a society as a whole can perform better if individuals are able to adjust
how creative they are over time in accordance with their perceived creative success.
When agents that were successful creators created more, and those that were
unsuccessful creators created less (SR), the mean fitness of outputs was higher and the
increase in diversity was more pronounced. Moreover, these results were due to the
segregation of agents over time into two groups—creators and imitators. Thus we
showed that it is possible to increase the mean fitness of ideas in a society by enabling
them to regulate how creative they are.
In Experiment Two the effect of SR on the pace of cultural evolution was
short-lived. Since the space of possibilities was closed, all agents eventually converged
on optimal outputs, and they could not find even better actions through chaining; there
was a ceiling effect. At this point there was no longer any social benefit to having some
members of society be dedicated creators. We hypothesized that this was because the
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agents were limited to a finite set of simple ideas.
In Experiment Three, where the space of possible outputs was open-ended, and
agents could execute multi-step outputs, agents once again segregated into creators and
imitators. However, comparing Figure 6 with Figure 10, we see that there is no longer a
ceiling effect; the difference in fitness between societies with SR and societies without it
now increases throughout the run. Thus, the results support our third hypothesis that
it is possible for the benefit of this social regulation mechanism to be ongoing rather
than temporary, if the space of possible creative outputs is open-ended, such that it
remains possible for fitter possibilities to be found. These findings suggest that it can
be beneficial for a social group if individuals follow different developmental trajectories
in accordance with their demonstrated successes, but only if the space of possible ideas
is such that there are always avenues to explore for new creative ideas.
Although the simplicity of the model must be kept in mind before jumping to
conclusions, the results of Experiments Two and Three are consistent with empirical
findings concerning the value of imitation in collaborative groups, e.g., when people
have access to their peers’ solutions, imitation facilitates not just scrounging but the
propagation of good solutions for further cumulative exploration (Wisdom, Song, &
Goldstone, 2013). These results fit in well with evidence compiled by Florida (2002) that
a natural distinction emerges in societies between the conventional workforce and the
creative class. Our results further suggest that this division of labor is adaptive; when
social regulation was in place the society as a whole benefited. The society was able to
capitalize on both the creative abilities of the best creators and the dissemination of fit
cultural outputs by the rest. This is in line with current thinking on the adaptive value
of individual differences in personality across group members (Nettle, 2006).
These results do not prove that in real societies successful creators invent more
and unsuccessful creators invent less; they merely show this kind of regulation of
creativity at the individual level is a feasible means of increasing the mean fitness of
creative outputs of the group as a whole. However, the fact that strong individual
differences in creativity exist (Kaufman, 2003; Wolfradt & Pretz, 2001) suggests that
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this does indeed occur in real societies. The question of whether, and how, social groups
balance creativity with conformity would appear to be a promising area for future
research. Based on the results obtained here, it seems reasonable to hypothesize
that—whether the regulation is prompted by individuals themselves or mediated by
way of social cues—families, organizations, or societies spontaneously self-organize to
achieve a balance between creative processes that generate innovations and the
imitative processes that disseminate these innovations. In other words, they evolve
faster by tempering novelty with continuity.
A more complex version of this scheme is that individuals find a task at which they
excel, such that for each task domain there exists some individual in the social group
who comes to be best equipped to explore that space of possibilities. To explore this in
EVOC would have required an individualized or dynamically changing fitness function.
Elsewhere we have investigated the effect of individualized and dynamically changing
fitness functions on the fitness and diversity of cultural outputs (Gabora, 2008a;
Gabora, Chia, & Firouzi, 2013). Although for the present initial explorations the results
were most easily interpretable with a static fitness function, in future research it would
be interesting to investigate how individualized or dynamic fitness functions affect SR.
In real life, people are faced with numerous different tasks on a daily basis that
are evaluated according to different criteria. Actions that are fit or appropriate for one
purpose (e.g., for making a specific tool) are not necessarily fit for another purpose
(e.g., for expressing agreement). Accordingly, if one examines only one creative task at
a time, a society may appear to perform optimally when the creating is left to a subset
of individuals. However, when one examines multiple creative tasks, the situation may
be more complex; in the extreme, everyone would find a different specialized niche for
their creative output, and be an imitator with respect to other specialized niches.
Experiments with a model that is related to but very different from EVOC suggest that
the capacity for hybrid learning—wherein agents acquire knowledge pertaining to one
environmental dimension through individual learning and knowledge pertaining to
another environmental dimension through imitation—can foster specialization that
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benefits society as a whole (Kharratzadeh, Montrey, Metz, & Shultz, 2015). Since
creative problem solving is a form of individual learning, it seems reasonable to suggest
there may be social benefits when individuals limit creative exploration to one or a few
domains and for other domains rely on social learning. The value of this arrangement
hangs on the extent to which creativity is domain-specific. The evidence here is mixed;
although the capacity for expert-level creative achievement may be predominantly
limited to a single domain (Baer, 1996; Ruscio, Whitney, & Amabile, 1998; Tardif &
Sternberg, 1988), many if not most individuals may be able to experience personally
meaningful and fulfilling creative engagement and express their personal creative style
through multiple domains (Gabora, O’Connor, & Ranjan, 2012; Hocevar, 1976; Plucker,
1998; Ranjan, 2014; Runco, 1987). The optimal distribution of creators and imitators
across different tasks may be therefore be complex, with different individuals tending to
specialize for different tasks, but some individuals exhibiting a generalized tendency
toward creativity and others exhibiting a generalized tendency toward imitation.
It has been suggested that the capacity to merge thoughts and ideas into chains of
association or ‘streams of thought’ initially emerged approximately 1.7 million years ago
due to increased cranial capacity accompanying the transition from Homo habilis to
Homo erectus (Donald, 1991). The increase in cranial capacity could have allowed for
more fleshed out representations, which in turn allowed for more associative pathways
amongst representations, and greater potential for streams of abstract thought.
Mathematical (Gabora & Aerts, 2009; Gabora & Kitto, 2013) and computational
(Gabora & DiPaola, 2012; Gabora, Chia, & Firouzi, 2013) models support the
feasibility of this scenario. The fact that in the experiments reported here social
regulation of creativity was found to be of lasting value only in societies composed of
agents capable of chaining suggests that there may have been insufficient selective
pressure for social regulation of creativity prior to onset of this capacity. Thus,
individual differences in creativity would be expected to have emerged after this time.
The social practice of discouraging creativity until the individual has proven him-
or herself may serve to ensure that creative efforts are not squandered. Individual
SOCIAL BENEFITS BALANCING CREATIVITY IMITATION 30
differences in responsiveness to social cues may ensure that some percentage of society
consists of individuals whose affiliative needs are low, and who therefore feel relatively
free to deviate from social norms and be creative. Those individuals who are most
tuned to social norms and expectations may over time become increasingly concerned
with imitating and cooperating with others in a manner that promotes cultural
continuity. Thus, their thoughts travel more well-worn routes, and they become
increasingly less likely to innovate. Others might be tuned to the demands of creative
tasks, less tethered to social norms and expectations, and therefore more likely to see
things from unconventional perspectives. Thus, they become more likely to come up
with solutions to problems or unexpected challenges, find new avenues for
self-expression, and contribute to the generation of cultural novelty. What Cropley et
al. (2010) refer to as the “dark side of creativity” may to some degree reflect that the
creative individual is tuned to task needs at the expense of human needs; ideas, not
people, are the objects of their nurturing. Although in the long run this benefits the
group as a whole because it results in creative outputs, in the short run the creative
individual may be less likely to obey social norms and live up to social expectations,
and to experience stigmatization or discrimination as a result, particularly in his/her
early years (Craft, 2005; Scott, 1999; Torrance, 1963). Once the merits of such
individuals’ creative efforts become known, they may be supported or even idolized.
A limitation of this work is that EVOC in its current implementation does not
accommodate selective or partial imitation. In other words, EVOC does not allow an
agent to imitate some features of an idea and not others. An agent either copies exactly
what a neighbor is doing or ignores that neighbor entirely for that iteration; it cannot
choose bits and pieces that would augment or complement its own current action. Nor
can an agent selectively combine elements of multiple different neighbors’ actions at
once. Consequently, imitation, while essential to the rapid spread of superior outputs,
exacerbates convergence on a small set of solutions, i.e., it has a destructive effect on
diversity. We expect that this effect would be reduced in investigations that incorporate
partial imitation. Partial imitation would also be useful for dealing with what in
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biology is referred to as epistasis, wherein what is optimal with respect to one
component depends on what is going on with respect to another. Once both
components have been optimized in a mutually beneficial way (in EVOC, for example,
symmetrical movement of both arms), excess creativity risks breaking up co-adapted
partial solutions. Note that the goal of this paper was not to develop a realistic model
of creativity per se but to investigate social factors in creativity. Nonetheless, in future
studies we plan to increase the sophistication of the mechanisms by which agents create
by incorporating ideas from the psychology of creativity (e.g., Gabora, 2017; Ward,
Smith, & Vaid, 1997) and formal models of individual creativity (e.g., Costello &
Keane, 2000; Dantzig, Raffone, & Hommel, 2011; Thagard & Stewart, 2011).
There are other avenues for future investigation suggested by this work. One is to
study more thoroughly the extent to which these findings are affected by the nature of
the task, or neighborhood network structure (cf. Jacobs, 2000; Liu, Madhavan, &
Sudharshan, 2005). Another avenue for future research is to investigate the impact of
varying the extent to which the generation of novelty is goal-directed versus random.
An early experiment on a predecessor to EVOC (Gabora, 1995) investigated (1) the
effect of turning on or off the ability to learn trends that bias the generation of
subsequent novelty, and (2) the effect of varying the extent to which new ideas deviate
from previous ideas. Both the ability to learn trends and the tendency to use successful
known ideas as a basis for generating new ideas decrease the extent to which generation
is random. The ability to learn trends increased the speed of convergence and decreased
the diversity of ideas. Performance was optimal when, on average, new ideas deviated
from old ones with respect to one component (i.e., movement of one body part
changed). Either increasing or decreasing the extent to which new ideas deviated from
old ones affected the speed of convergence but not the overall pattern of results.
Yet another avenue for future research is to investigate the relative impact of
nature versus nurture. In Experiment Three, the observed individual differences were
completely due to ‘nurture’ rather than ‘nature’. It would be interesting to see how
initializing a run with individual differences in creative ability amongst agents affects
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the pattern of results. It would also be interesting to investigate the impact of
individual differences in agents’ responses to assessments of their creative efforts, such
as variation in their responses to positively versus negatively valence assessments. This
would enable us to, for example, model the impact of possible gender differences in the
tendency to decrease creative output in response to negative assessments of one’s
creative work, or increase creative output in response to positive assessments. If this is
the case then even if the creative potential of boys and girls is initially equal they may
exhibit gender differences in creativity by the time they reach adulthood.
As mentioned in the introduction, many supposed models of cultural evolution are
actually models of cultural transmission. To demonstrate cultural transmission, as few
as two cultural variants with error-prone copying is sufficient, whereas cultural
evolution entails cumulative, creative, open-ended, adaptive cultural change. This
confusion has led to misleading claims and analyses. Some of these are discussed
elsewhere (Gabora, 2011, 2013); one that has not been discussed concerns Rogers’
(1988) paradox: the finding that when social learning and individual learning strategies
are at equilibrium, social learning does not enhance average individual fitness.
Although much as been made of Rogers’ result (see Enquist, Eriksson, & Ghirlanda,
2007; Kameda & Nakanishi, 2003; Kharratzadeh, Montrey, Metz, & Shultz, 2015;
Rendell, Fogarty, & Laland, 2010), his conclusions hinge on the assumption of a
temporally varying environment, for without this there is no benefit in the model to
individual learning. The value of individual learning here lies solely in that it facilitates
the tracking of environmental change because the model does not incorporate creativity.
The supposed paradox yielded by Rogers’ model reflects an underlying lack of
understanding of the central role of creativity in individual learning. In the real world,
even if the environment remains basically unchanged, we benefit from finding creative
new ways of conceptualizing and responding to this world. Moreover, the distinction
between social learning and individual learning may not be as fundamental as Rogers’
model assumes to be; for example, it isn’t obvious that imitating a peer is
fundamentally different from imitating a cartoon character, or from a beatboxer
SOCIAL BENEFITS BALANCING CREATIVITY IMITATION 33
imitating the sounds of instruments, or a dancer imitating the wind. The approach
taken here speaks to the new and important questions and perspectives that can be
addressed when creativity is incorporated into a model of cultural evolution.
Conclusions
While society seems to value creativity in the abstract, social institutions are
often perceived as wielding excessive social pressure to conform, and placing obstacles
to creative self-expression in the paths of creative individuals until they have proven
themselves. The results of the experiments reported here suggest that there is a logic to
these seemingly contradictory messages. Since a proportion of individuals benefit from
creativity without being creative themselves by imitating creators, the rate of cultural
evolution increases when the novelty-generating effects of creativity are tempered with
the novelty-preserving effects of imitation. If there were few creators they could afford
to be more creative, and vice versa; if there were many their creativity had to be
restrained to exert the same global benefit for the society. Excess creativity was
detrimental because creators invested in unproven ideas at the expense of propagating
proven ones.
We also obtained evidence that society can benefit by rewarding and punishing
creativity on the basis of creative success. When each agent regulated its
invention-to-imitation ratio as a function of the fitness of its cultural outputs, they
segregated into creators and imitators, and the mean fitness of cultural outputs was
higher. When the space of possible outputs was fixed, the beneficial effect of social
regulation was temporary. However, making the space of possible outputs open-ended
by enabling agents to chain simple outputs into complex ones, caused the social
regulation induced increase in mean fitness of cultural outputs to be sustained.
Although the model used here is vastly simpler than real societies it enabled us to
manipulate the ratio of creators to imitators and the degree to which creators are
creative in a controlled manner and observe the result. This led to the hypothesis
concerning how creativity is regulated that was explored in experiment two.
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Experiment two in turn led to the hypothesis explored in experiment three concerning
the conditions under which the benefits of social regulation of creativity are long term.
The fact that each experiment yielded insights that led to a new hypothesis speaks to
the value of the approach. Although further investigation is needed to establish the
relevance of these results to real societies, we believe they constitute an important step
forward to understand the underlying mechanisms that enable societies to balance
novelty with continuity.
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Appendix: Training the Network
To train the network, the activation of nodes is updated as follows. The relevant
variables are:
aj = activation of j
tj = jth component of input
wij = weight on link from i to j
β = 0.15
θ = 0.5
aj =
1
(1 + e−β[
∑
wijai+θ])
(10)
For the movement node, we use the absolute value of ai (since negative movement
is not possible; the least you can move is to not move at all). The comparison between
input and output involves computing an error term, which is used to modify the pattern
of connectivity in the network such that its responses become more correct. For
input/output units the error term is computed as follows:
δj = (tj − aj)aj(1− aj) (11)
For hidden units the error term is computed as follows:
δi = aj(1− aj)
∑
δjwij (12)
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Table 1
Definitions used in the evaluation of chained actions.
Term Definition Example
Body Part Component of agent other
than neural network.
Left Arm (LA)
Sub-action Set of six components that
indicates position of 6 body
parts. Each can be in a
neutral (0), up (1), or down
(-1) position.
{HD:0, LA:1, RA:-1, LL:1,
RL:0, HP:-1; This
sub-action is abbreviated
01-110-1}
Action One or more sequential
sub-actions.
{{01001-1}, {-10-1-111}}
Template Abstract or prototypical
format for a sub-action.
Position of a body part can
be unspecified (*).
{HD:0, LA:*, RA:1, LL:*,
RL:1, HP:-1}
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Table 2
A partial set of the templates used in the first fitness function
T 1 = {0, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗} T 24 = {1, ∗, ∗, 1, 1, ∗}
T 2 = {∗, 0, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗} T 25 = {1, ∗, 1, ∗, 1, ∗}
T 3 = {∗, ∗, 0, ∗, ∗, ∗} T 26 = {1, ∗, 1, 1, ∗, ∗}
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Figure 1 . The core of an agent is an auto-associative neural network composed of six
input nodes and six corresponding output nodes that represent concepts of body parts
(LEFT ARM, RIGHT ARM, LEFT LEG, RIGHT LEG, HEAD, and HIPS), and seven
hidden nodes that represent more abstract concepts (LEFT, RIGHT, ARM, LEG,
SYMMETRY, MOVEMENT and OPPOSITE). Input nodes and output nodes are
connected to hidden nodes of which they are instances (e.g. RIGHT ARM is connected
to RIGHT.) The hidden nodes are used to bias invention using learned trends about
what constitutes a fit action.
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Figure 2 . 3D graph of the log10 Time-to-Threshold (TTT) landscape of the average
mean fitness for different values of C and p, with τ = 9. The valley in the fitness
landscape indicates that the optimal values of C and p for the society as a whole are
less than their maximum values for most C, p settings.
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Figure 3 . Top-view contour plot of the log10 Time-to-Threshold (TTT) landscape of the
average mean fitness for different values of C and p, with τ = 9. The line, obtained by
visually extrapolating over minimum values C and p, indicates the set of optima.
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Figure 4 . 3D graph of the Present Innovation Value (PIV) landscape of the average
mean fitness for different values of C and p. Since the x axis has been inverted to aid
visibility of the adaptive landscape, the valley again indicates that the optimal values of
C and p for the society as a whole are less than their maximum values for most C, p
settings.
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Figure 5 . Top-view contour plot of the Present Innovation Value (PIV) landscape of
average mean fitness for different values of C and p. The line, obtained by visually
extrapolating over maximum values C and p, indicates the set of optima.
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Figure 6 . This graph plots the mean fitness of implemented actions across all agents
over the duration of the run, with and without social regulation.
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Figure 7 . This graph plots the mean diversity of implemented actions across all agents
over the duration of the run, with and without social regulation.
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Figure 8 . This graph plots the fitness of actions obtained through invention on the y
axis and through imitation on the x axis. Fitness values are given as a proportion of the
fitness of an optimally fit action. The curved line is a pareto frontier because it consists
of different optimal allocations of actions, ranging from always inventing optimally
(upper left end of curve), to always implementing an optimal action obtained through
imitation (bottom right end of curve), as well as strategies involving a mixture of
inventing and imitating (all other points along the curve). Points to the left of this
curve indicate strategies that involve the execution of suboptimal actions. Each small
red circle shows the mean fitness of an agent’s actions obtained through invention and
imitation averaged across ten iterations: iterations 1 to 10 in the top graph, 25 to 35 in
the middle graph, and 90 to 100 in the bottom graph. Since by iteration 90 all values
were piled up in two spots—the upper left and the bottom right—they are indicated by
large red circles at these locations.
SOCIAL BENEFITS BALANCING CREATIVITY IMITATION 55
Figure 9 . Schematic illustration of the process by which an agent determines what
action it will implement in the next iteration without chaining (above) and with
chaining (below).
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Figure 10 . This graph plots the mean fitness of actions across all agents over the course
of the run with chaining turned on, with and without social regulation (SR).
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Figure 11 . This graph plots the mean diversity of implemented actions across all agents
over the course of the run with chaining, with and without social regulation (SR).
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Figure 12 . At the beginning of the run (top) all agents created and imitated with equal
probability. Midway through the run their p(C) values were distributed along the range
of values from 0 to 1. By the end of the run (bottom) they had segregated into
imitators (with p(C) from 0 to 0.1) and creators (with p(C) from 0.9 to 1).
